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Abstract 
This  paper  studies  how  firm  heterogeneity  in  terms  of  productivity  affects  the  balance 
between  agglomeration  and  dispersion  forces  in  the  presence  of  pecuniary  externalities 
through a selection model of monopolistic competition with variable mark-ups. It shows that 
firm heterogeneity matters. However, whether it shifts the balance from agglomeration to 
dispersion or the other way round depends on its specific features along the two defining 
dimensions  of  diversity:  ‘richness’  and  ‘evenness’.  Accordingly,  the  role  of  firm 
heterogeneity  in  selection  models  of  agglomeration  cannot  be  fully  understood  without 
paying due attention to various moments of the underlying firm productivity distribution. 
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 G. I. Ottaviano, submitted 2012 1 Introduction
This paper studies how ￿rm heterogeneity in terms of productivity a⁄ects the
balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces in the presence of pecu-
niary externalities through a selection model of monopolistic competition with
variable mark-ups. This is achieved by introducing ￿rm heterogeneity ￿ la
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) in a core-periphery framework ￿ la Ottaviano,
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002). In so doing, the paper builds on Ottaviano (2011)
but with major departures. The model in Ottaviano (2011) is a dynamic model
of capital accumulation with forward-looking agents in closed economy. Dif-
ferently, this paper proposes a dynamic model of migration with short-sighted
agents in open economy. As in Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), the econ-
omy is ￿ open￿in terms of both goods trade and factor mobility while ￿ short sight￿
(due to heavy time discounting) is assumed in order to remove the possibility of
self-full￿lling equilibria. These would add an extra layer of complexity beyond
the scope of the present paper.
In the proposed model there are two locations that are identical in terms of
their exogenous attributes. There are two factors of production: high-skill labor
and low-skill labor. The former is freely mobile whereas the second is spatially
immobile and evenly distributed between locations. There are two sectors: a
perfectly competitive sector employing only low-skill labor to produce a homoge-
nous good under constant returns to scale; and a monopolistically competitive
sector employing both high-skill and low-skill labor to produce varieties of a
horizontally di⁄erentiated good. In this sector high-skill labor is hired to de-
sign blueprints for the production of varieties and low-skill labor to produce the
varieties according to those blueprints. In each period, high-skill workers ￿rst
decide in which location to reside, then the monopolistically competitive ￿rms
decide whether and where to enter the market by hiring them. Subsequently
high-skill workers engage in research and development with uncertain outcome
in terms of the productivities of their blueprints. Once these productivities are
revealed, ￿rms decide whether to use the corresponding blueprints for produc-
tion or just leave the market without producing. At the end of period, blueprints
fully depreciate becoming useless. This admittedly stark assumption is made to
abstract from sorting and focus on selection.
In this framework, the e⁄ects of heterogeneity on the balance between ag-
glomeration and dispersion forces depend on which dimension of heterogeneity
is a⁄ected and how it is a⁄ected. In particular, de￿ning heterogeneity as ￿ di-
versity￿ , heterogeneity is considered along two dimensions: ￿ richness￿measures
the ￿ number￿of alternative productivity levels that can be drawn; ￿ evenness￿is
de￿ned as the similarity between the probabilities with which those alternative
productivity levels are drawn (Maignan, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Rullani, 2003).
It is shown that, when productivity draws follow a Pareto distribution, the ef-
fects of more heterogeneity di⁄er depending on whether more heterogeneity is
achieved through more richness or more evenness. There are two orders of rea-
sons for this. First, under the Pareto distribution assumption, more richness
comes with a higher chance of low productivity draws whereas more evenness
2comes with a higher chance of high productivity draws. Second, under the
Pareto distribution assumption, the elasticity of the success rate of entry is
a⁄ected by evenness but not by richness.
In terms of ￿ndings, the proposed model exhibits all the key feature of the
model by Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) and of similar models in the
￿ new economic geography￿tradition. In particular, trade barriers regulate the
balance between agglomeration forces (market-size and cost-of-living e⁄ects) and
dispersion forces (competition e⁄ect): starting with high enough trade barriers,
trade liberalization shifts the spatial equilibrium from dispersion to agglomera-
tion. The proposed model, however, introduces ￿rm selection as an additional
dispersion force.
A ￿rst implication of this additional force is that, di⁄erently from Otta-
viano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), the emergence of agglomerated equilibria is
not chatastrophic with the spatial economy suddenly moving from dispersion
to full agglomeration when trade barriers fall below a certain threshold. It is,
instead, smooth: as trade barriers gradually fall, at some point the dispersed al-
location loses stability to two stable equilibria with partial agglomeration evenly
spaced around it. These are initially in a neighborhood of the dispersed alloca-
tion. Then, as trade barriers keep on falling, they gradually move away from
dispersion until the economy hits full agglomeration. Hence, thanks to selection
among heterogeneous ￿rms, the model is able to generate the realistic feature
of partial agglomeration as a stable equilibrium outcome provided that trade
barriers are neither too high nor too low. In this equilibrium, the larger location
exhibits more entrants, more sellers and thus more product variety, lower aver-
age cost, lower average price, lower average markup. As all these features imply
higher consumer surplus, the engineers￿indi⁄erence condition that sustains the
equilibrium holds due lower expected pro￿ts driven by a lower success rate of
entry that more than o⁄sets a higher average pro￿t from successful entry.
A second implication concerns the impact of heterogeneity on the balance
between agglomeration and dispersion forces for given trade barriers. More
(cost-increasing) richness shifts the balance in favor of agglomeration forces.
This happens because selection in the larger location gets weaker as worse pro-
ductivity draws become possible. The impact of more (cost-decreasing) evenness
is more complex. When the initial distribution of productivity draws is already
rather even, more evenness shifts the balance in favor of agglomeration forces.
Vice versa, when the initial distribution of productivity draws is rather uneven,
more evenness shifts the balance in favor of dispersion forces. The reason for
this is that, when the initial evenness is low, more evenness has a weak positive
impact on the average pro￿t di⁄erential and a strong negative e⁄ect on the entry
success rate di⁄erential between locations, thus fostering dispersion. Vice versa,
when the initial evenness is already high, more evenness has a strong positive
e⁄ect on the average pro￿t di⁄erential and a weak negative e⁄ect on the entry
success rate di⁄erential, thus fostering agglomeration. This is due to the fact
that evenness a⁄ects the elasticity of the success rate of entry to the toughness
of competition. Di⁄erently, more richness does not a⁄ect that elasticity.
The punchline of the paper is that ￿rm heterogeneity matters for the balance
3between agglomeration and dispersion forces. However, whether it shifts the
balance from agglomeration to dispersion or the other way round depends on
its speci￿c features along both the richness and the evenness dimensions.
There are a few related models in the spatial economics literature. These
di⁄er among themselves in terms of whether agents￿heterogeneity is assumed to
be revealed before or after their location decisions. Sorting models study how
ex ante heterogenous agents self-select into locations of di⁄erent sizes (Nocke,
2006; Baldwin and Okubo, 2006; Davis, 2010; Okubo, Picard and Thisse, 2010;
Okubo and Picard, 2011).1 The present paper di⁄ers from these models in that
it studies selection, where heterogeneity materializes ex post after agents have
already committed to their locations and where agents self-select in whatever
economic activities are available in those locations. In this respect, the most
closely related models are the ones put forth by Behrens and Robert-Nicoud
(2009) and Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud (2010). The former is a se-
lection model that also builds on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) where ex ante
identical individuals decide whether or not to move from a common rural hin-
terland to cities. Their heterogeneity is revealed after this decision has been
made and the decision itself is assumed to be irreversible so as to rule out sort-
ing. They show that larger market size increases productivity not only through
a ￿ner division of labour driven by pecuniary externalities (richer availability
of intermediates) but also through a selection process, whereas higher produc-
tivity increases market size by providing incentives for rural-urban migration.
Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud (2010) analyze both sorting and selection
in a model in which agglomeration is driven by technological externalities. They
distinguish between ex ante heterogenity (￿ talent￿ ), known to agents before they
decide where to locate, and ex post heterogeneity (￿ luck￿ ), revealed to agents af-
ter their location decisions have been made. Agents choose locations based on
their talent and occupations in the chosen locations based on luck too. More
talented agents stand a better chance of ￿nding more productive occupations in
larger locations and this complementarity between talent and market size leads
to the sorting of more talented agents into larger markets. Then, tougher se-
lection in more talented locations implies more productive occupations. Higher
productivity, in turn, complements the agglomeration bene￿ts of larger loca-
tions so that more talented markets are larger in equilibrium. Unlike Behrens,
Duranton and Robert-Nicoud (2010) but just like Behrens and Robert-Nicoud
(2009), the model in the present paper dispenses with ex ante heterogeneity
to focus on selection. However, di⁄erently from Behrens and Robert-Nicoud
(2009), it allows for reversible location decisions between sites whose urban vs.
rural status is endogenously determined as an outcome of those decisions. In
the terminology of Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud (2010), agents with
no ex ante ￿ talent￿are free to move across markets knowing that their ￿ luck￿
may change every day no matter whether they relocate or not.2 Moreover,
1While this and other papers focus on ￿rm heterogeneity on the supply side in terms of
productivity, the distinctive feature of Okubo and Picard (2011) is their study of heterogeneity
on the demand side in terms of tastes.
2Behrens, Mion, Murata and S￿dekum (2011) make a similar assumption in their study
4di⁄erently from Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud (2010), in the model
of the present paper the emergence of agglomeration is driven by pecuniary
rather than technological externalities. Finally, while in Behrens, Duranton
and Robert-Nicoud (2010) constant markups imply that, after conditioning out
sorting and agglomeration, selection becomes independent of market size, in
the present paper tougher selection is associated with larger market size as in
Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2009).3
The rest of the paper is organized in three sections. Section 2 develops
the model in an isolated economy to investigate how heterogeneity a⁄ects the
relation between market size and selection. Section 3 extends the model to
a two-location spatial economy with high-skill labor mobility to examine how
heterogeneity a⁄ects the balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Isolated Economy
There are L identical ￿ workers￿ , each supplying a unit of low-skill labor inelasti-
cally. Accordingly, L is both the number of workers and the economy endowment
of low-skill labor. There are also M identical ￿ engineers￿ , each supplying a unit
of high-skill labor inelastically. Accordingly, M is both the number of engineers
and the economy endowment of high-skill labor.
2.1 Preferences
Workers and engineers all share the same individual preferences captured by
the following quasi-linear quadratic utility function de￿ned over a homogenous























of spatial frictions within a multi-location framework that allows for the joint determination
of locations￿ sizes, productivities, markups, wages, consumption diversity, and the number
and size distribution of ￿rms. Their demand system is, however, di⁄erent from the one in
the present paper. Also di⁄erent is the fact that their model always features a unique spatial
equilibrium. It is, therefore, silent on the e⁄ects of ￿rm heterogeneity on the balance between
agglomeration and dispersion forces, which is the focus of the present analysis.
3Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga and Roux (2011) also extend the model of Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008) to allow for agglomeration economies driven by technological externalities.
Their aim is to derive a parsimonious framework to test the relative importance of selection and
agglomeration in determining the spatial distribution of ￿rm productivities. Following Melitz
and Ottaviano (2008), they do not allow for labor mobility across locations. Nonetheless,
in a separate on-line appendix (http://diegopuga.org/papers/selectagg_webapp.pdf), they
show how their model can be further extended to introduce worker mobility, consumption
amenities, and urban crowding costs, without at the same time a⁄ecting its key equilibrium
equations on which their empirical analysis is based. In so doing, they restrict their attention
to a situation in which there exists a unique stable spatial equilibrium with (asymmetric)
dispersion. Whether heterogeneity fosters agglomeration or dispersion is, thus, beyond the
scope of their paper.
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0, N and qc(!) respectively denoting the individual consumption level of
the homogenous good, the measure (￿ number￿ ) of available varieties of the dif-
ferentiated good and the individual consumption level of variety !. Parameters
are all positive with ￿ measuring product di⁄erentiation.
2.2 Technology
There are two sectors, one supplying the homogenous good and the other supply-
ing the varieties of the di⁄erentiated good. The homogenous good is produced
under perfect competition employing low-skill labor as the only input. Speci￿-
cally, production of a unit of homogenous output requires a worker. Marginal
cost pricing then implies that the price of the homogenous good equals the low-
skill wage. By choosing this good as numeraire, also the low-skill wage is set to
unity.
The di⁄erentiated varieties are supplied by monopolistically competitive
￿rms employing both low- and high-skill labor. In particular, a ￿rm enters the
market by hiring fE engineers to design the blueprint of a di⁄erentiated variety
and the corresponding production process, whose implementation then requires
hiring a number of workers proportionate to the desired scale of production.
Developing the blueprint of a variety and its production process is an activity
with uncertain outcome in terms of productive e¢ ciency. Speci￿cally, while en-
gineers are always certain to design new varieties, the unit worker requirements
of the corresponding production processes are determined by random draws from
some distribution. The timing of events is as follows. Firms decide whether to
enter or not. If they decide to enter, they have to competitively bid for the
given stock of M engineers. Once these have been allocated to the NE = M=fE
winning bidders, each of these entrants is assigned its unit worker requirement
c as a random draw from a common continuous di⁄erentiable distribution with
c.d.f. G(c) over the support [0;cM]. Based on their draws, entrants then decide
whether to produce or not. Letting ￿ denote the (endogenous) share of entrants
that decide to produce (￿ success rate of entry￿ ), the mass (￿ number￿ ) of produc-
ers equals N = ￿NE as the number of producers equals the number of varieties
available for consumption. Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Behrens and
Robert-Nicoud (2009) and Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud (2010), the
marginal product of workers ’ is assumed to follow a Pareto distribution with
shaper parameter k ￿ 1 and support [1=cM;1]. This implies that the c.d.f. of






; c 2 [0;cM] (2)
The two parameters in (2) regulate the ￿ heterogeneity￿ , or ￿ diversity￿ , of
cost draws. This has two dimensions (Maignan, Ottaviano, Pinelli and Rullani,
2003). First, cM quanti￿es ￿ richness￿de￿ned as the measure (￿ number￿ ) of dif-
ferent unit labor requirments that can be drawn. Larger cM leads to a rise in
heterogeneity along the richness dimension, and this is achieved by making it
6possible to draw also larger unit worker requirements than the original ones.
Second, k is an inverse measure of ￿ evenness￿de￿ned as the similarity between
the probabilities of those di⁄erent draws to happen. When k = 1, the unit
labor requirement distribution is uniform on [0;cM] with maximum evenness.
As k increases, the unit worker requirement distribution becomes more concen-
trated at higher unit worker requirements close to cM: evenness falls. As k
goes to in￿nity, the distribution becomes degenerate at cM: all draws deliver
a unit worker requirement cM with probability one. Hence, smaller k leads to
a rise in heterogeneity along the evenness dimension, and this is achieved by
making low unit worker requirements more likely without changing the unit
worker requirements that are possible. Accordingly, more richness (larger cM)
comes with higher average unit worker requirement (￿ cost-increasing richness￿ ),
more evenness (smaller k) comes with lower average unit worker requirement
(￿ cost-decreasing evenness￿ ).
To ￿nance their entry, ￿rms borrow from workers. These are assumed to
hold identical balanced portfolios across all entrants, so they do not face any
risk. Due to free entry, in equilibrium ￿rms have to be indi⁄erent between
entering or not. This implies that, through competitive bidding, the engineers￿
remunerations absorb all expected pro￿ts from entry. The law of large numbers
then ensures that these ex ante expected pro￿ts exactly match the ex post
average pro￿ts of producers (themselves equal to the ex ante expected pro￿t
conditional on producing) times the share of entrants that decide to produce
(itself equal to the ex ante probability that an entrant becomes a producer).
Engineers￿remunerations are, therefore, the same ex ante and ex post, and both
ex ante and ex post workers￿earnings on their lending are driven to zero. The





p(!)qc(!)d! = 1 + qc
0 (3)





p(!)qc(!)d! = ￿e ￿=fE + qc
0 (4)
for an engineer, with p(!), e ￿ and qc
0 respectively denoting the price of variety
!, the average producer pro￿t and an initial endowment of the numeraire good
that is assumed to be the same for all individuals and large enough to ensure
its positive consumption.
2.3 Consumption
Due to the quasi-linearity of (1), the fact that workers￿and engineers￿incomes
di⁄er has no bearing on their consumption of the di⁄erentiated varieties: in-
come di⁄erences are entirely transmitted to di⁄erent consumption levels of the
homogenous good.4 Thus, the maximization of (1) subject to the budget con-
4For a discussion of income e⁄ects in an urban context with selection among heterogeneous
￿rms, see Behrens, Mion, Murata and S￿dekum (2011).
7straints (3) or (4) gives the same FOC with respect to qc(!) for all individuals,
implying an inverse demand relation that is independent of income






is total individual consumption of the di⁄erentiated varieties.
Individual consumption can be obtained as follows. First, integrate (5)








p(!)d!. Hence, ￿ > e p = P=N has to hold if any consumption has
to take place at all (Qc > 0). In other words the average price e p must not be









Accordingly, varieties priced above the choke price
p￿ ￿
￿￿ + ￿Ne p
￿ + ￿N
(7)
are not bought (qc(!) = 0) while individual inverse demand of any variety with
price below the choke price can be written as
p(!) = p￿ ￿ ￿qc(!)
with corresponding total demand and total inverse demand respectively equal
to








after aggregating across all workers and engineers.

























This is an increasing function of own price p(!) and a decreasing function of
the choke price p￿. It is also an increasing function of the number of consumers
8L + M as well as a decreasing function of the quantity demanded q(!) and
the extent of product di⁄erentiation ￿. Note that the impact of changing p￿ is
stronger for higher p(!). In turn, given (7), the choke price p￿ is a decreasing
function of the number of producers N as well as a decreasing function of their
average price e p. Hence, any increase (decrease) in the number of producers as
well as any decrease (increase) in their average price leads to a rise (fall) in the
elasticity of demand. This makes competition tougher (softer) for all ￿rms but
disproportionately so for high price ￿rms.
2.4 Production
Pro￿t maximization by monopolistically competitive ￿rms requires marginal
revenue to match marginal cost. Given total inverse demand (8), the FOC for






This uniquely identi￿es a cuto⁄ unit worker requirement or, equivalently given
unit wage, a cuto⁄ marginal cost
c￿ = p￿ (10)
such that q(c￿) = 0 and only ￿rms whose unit worker requirement satis￿es
c ￿ c￿ end up producing. Conditional on this cuto⁄, the unit worker requirement
























(c￿ ￿ c) (12)
which can be plugged into total inverse demand (8) to obtain the corresponding
price, markup, revenue and pro￿t as functions of own and cuto⁄marginal costs:
p(c) = 1
2 (c￿ + c) ￿(c) = 1








4￿ (c￿ ￿ c)
2 (13)
As more productive ￿rms have lower marginal cost c, they are bigger in terms
of both output and revenues. They also quote lower prices but have higher
markups. As higher markups are associated with larger output, more productive
￿rms generate more pro￿ts. Moreover, a lower cuto⁄ c￿ reduces the price, the
output, the revenue and the pro￿t of all ￿rms. By increasing the elasticity of
demand, it also reduces the markup, which makes c￿ an inverse measure of the
toughness of competition.
9Based on (13) and (2), average price, average markup and average output
evaluate to
e p = 2k+1
2(k+1)c￿
e ￿ = c
￿
2(k+1)
e q = L+M
2￿(k+1)c￿
(14)
where e c labels the average unit worker requirement, i.e. the mean unit worker
requirement calculated for the conditional distribution G(c)=G(c￿) = (c=c￿)
k as







2￿ (k + 2)(k + 1)
(c￿)2 (15)
The ￿ free entry condition￿ , entailing that the engineers￿remunerations absorb
all expected pro￿ts from entry, can then be stated as
￿e ￿ = wfE (16)
where w is the high-skill wage.






which shows that N > 0 requires ￿ > c￿. All the rest given, a larger number of
producers (larger N) is associated with tougher competition (lower c￿).
2.5 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the closed economy is fully characterize by ￿ve equations in
the following ￿ve unknowns: ￿, e ￿, w, N and c￿. The ￿ve equations are: (15),
(16), (17), ￿ = G(c￿) and N = ￿M=fE. These last two equations can be used
together with (15) to substitute e ￿, ￿ and N out of (16) and (17), reducing the
characterization of the equilibrium to the solution of a system of two equations















(k + 2)(k + 1)
(19)
There exists a unique value of c￿ solving the ￿ zero cuto⁄ pro￿t condition￿(18):
its left-hand side is increasing whereas its right-hand side is decreasing in c￿.
Some but not all entrants decide to produce (hence, there is ￿ selection￿ ) as long
as that unique value of c￿ falls in the interval [0;cM]. A su¢ cient condition for







10The argument behind (20) goes as follows. The left-hand side of (18) evaluates
to 0 at c￿ = 0 and increases in c￿ for c￿ > 0. Its right-hand side goes to in￿nity
￿and is thus larger that the left-hand side ￿in a neighborhood of c￿ = 0 and
decreases in c￿ for c￿ > 0. Accordingly, as (20) implies that at cM the left-hand
side is larger than the right-hand side, the two sides must achieve the same value
for some value of c￿ between 0 and cM. Hence, the Pareto assumption and (20)
together ensure the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium cuto⁄ marginal
cost with selection.
The monotonicity properties of the left- and right-hand sides of (18) also
imply that the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium cuto⁄are read-
ily assessed: a larger endowment of engineers (larger M), a smaller entry costs
(smaller fE), weaker product di⁄erentiation (smaller ￿), weaker preference for
the di⁄erentiated varieties with respect to the homogenous good (smaller ￿ and
larger ￿) all lead to a smaller c￿ and, therefore, to tougher competition. More
workers have, instead, no bearing on competition. As for the impact of hetero-
geneity, if cM increases, c￿ has also to increase to satisfy (18) and, given that
the right-hand side of this equation also adjusts, the increase in c￿ is less that
proportionate to the increase in cM. Product variety falls accordingly. Lower
k raises (c￿=cM)
k on the left-hand side of (18) given c￿=cM < 1 under (20),
and reduces (k + 1) on its right-hand side so that c￿ has to fall to keep (18)
satis￿ed. Hence, when heterogeneity grows because some additional bad draws
become possible, selection gets weaker. Vice versa, when heterogeneity grows
because the probability of the already existing good draws increases, selection
gets tougher.
Given the equilibrium cuto⁄, the ￿ free entry condition￿ (19) then uniquely






(k + 2)(k + 1)
Therefore, for any given c￿, a larger number of consumers (larger L or larger
M), weaker product di⁄erentiation (smaller ￿) and lower entry costs (smaller
fE) increase the engineers￿remuneration w. Three parameters, however, have
an ambiguous overall e⁄ect on the high-skill wage once their parallel impact on
c￿ is factored in. Larger M leads, on the one hand, to tougher competition and
hence lower expected pro￿t but, on the other hand, to a larger market, hence
to larger expected ￿rm size and larger expected pro￿t. Smaller fE leads, on the
one hand, to tougher competition and hence lower expected pro￿t but, on the
other hand, to fewer engineers sharing those expected pro￿ts. Smaller ￿ leads,
on the one hand, to tougher competition and thus lower expected pro￿t but, on
the other hand, to larger expected ￿rm size and thus larger expected pro￿ts.
5Note that the logical sequence of solving for the equilibrium in the present model is
opposite to the one required to solve the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). There the
equilibrium cuto⁄ marginal cost is uniquely determined by the ￿ free entry condition￿and the
￿ zero cuto⁄ pro￿t condition￿then determines the equilibrium number of producers given the
equilibrium cuto⁄.
11Once the equilibrium cuto⁄ marginal cost and the corresponding number of
￿rms N = G(c￿)M=fE are determined, welfare can be evaluated by noticing that
the consumption choice that maximizes utility (1) yields the following indirect
utility function:











where Ic is consumer income (equal to either 1 for workers or w for engineers)
and V c ￿ Ic is consumer surplus. To ensure positive demand levels for the
numeraire, one has to assume that Ic >
R N
0 p(!)qc(!)dG￿(!). Tougher com-
petition (smaller c￿) is good for consumer surplus V c ￿ Ic, neutral for workers￿
income (Ic = 1) and bad for engineers￿income (Ic = w). It is good for consumer
surplus because selection leads to lower prices (due to both lower marginal costs
and smaller markups ) and richer product variety. Vice versa, it is bad for engi-
neers￿income due to two concurring events. First, tougher competition reduces
the fraction of entrants that eventually produce. Second, the average pro￿t of
these producers falls.
2.6 Market size, heterogeneity and competition
How do market size and heterogeneity interact in determining the intensity of
competition? Consider the e⁄ect of increasing market size by raising the number
of engineers as these will be the mobile factor in open economy. As already
argued, larger M leads to smaller c￿. The question then is how heterogeneity


































k 2￿fE (k + 1)
2 ((k + 1)￿ ￿ kc￿)
2 > 0
The ￿rst expression above con￿rms that larger market size (larger M) makes
competition tougher (smaller c￿). Heterogeneity a⁄ects the strenght of this
e⁄ect. According to the second expression, more cost-increasing richness (larger
cM) weakens the impact of larger market size on competition. The opposite
holds for more cost-decreasing evenness (smaller k) as the third expressions
shows that is dampens the competition enhancing drive of larger market size.
Hence, heterogeneity fosters the tougher competition of larger markets only if
it generates a better breed of ￿rms.
123 The Spatial Economy
Consider now a spatial economy consisting of two locations, H and F. Each
location is endowed with L=2 identical workers. Workers are geographically im-
mobile and, as before, each worker supplies a unit of low-skill labor inelastically
so that L=2 is both the number of workers and the endowment of low-skill labor
in each location. The economy is also endowed with M identical engineers each
supplying a unit of high-skill labor inelastically so that M is both the number
of engineers and the economy endowment of high-skill labor. Di⁄erently from
workers, engineers are geographically mobile and choose to reside in the location
that o⁄ers them higher utility. The shares of engineers residing in locations H
and F are called sH = ￿ and sF = 1 ￿ ￿ respectively, with ￿ 2 [0;1].
3.1 Preferences and technology
Workers and engineers share the same preferences in both locations, de￿ned
over a homogenous good and a continuum of di⁄erentiated varieties as captured
by the utility function (1). They also have the same exogenous endowment
qc
0 of the homogenous good. As before, this good is produced under perfect
competition and constant returns to scale. Moreover, it is freely traded between
locations. As a worker is needed to produce a unit of the homogenous good,
choosing this good as numeraire implies that both its price and workers￿wage
are equalized to one across locations. The varieties of the di⁄erentiated good
are produced by monopolistically competitive ￿rms and their trade between
locations is hampered by iceberg costs: ￿ > 1 units have to be shipped for
a unit to reach destination. Production faces similar technological constraints
as in the isolated economy. Speci￿cally, ￿rms choose which location to enter
by hiring fE local engineers in order to develop a di⁄erentiated variety and
the corresponding production process. The supply of the di⁄erentiated variety
then requires hiring a number of workers proportionate to the desired scale of
production. Accordingly, the number of entrants in the two locations is dictated
by the spatial allocation of engineers: NH
E = sHM=fE and NF
E = sFM=fE.
In a period the timing of events is as follows. Firms decide whether and where
to enter taking the residential choices of engineers as given. If they decide to
enter a location, they have to competitively bid for the stock of local engineers.
Once these have been allocated to the winning bidders, in both locations each
entrant is assigned its unit worker requirement c as a random draw from the
common distribution G(c) with support [0;cM]. This distribution is the same
across locations and is speci￿ed by (2). Based on their draws, entrants then
decide whether to produce or not. In so doing, they are bound to produce in
the location they have entered. This assumption is made to avoid sorting and
focus on selection instead.
To ￿nance their entry in a given location, ￿rms can borrow from local workers
only. These are assumed to hold riskless balanced portfolios across all entrants
in their own location. Due to free entry and competitive bidding, in equilibrium
￿rms have to be indi⁄erent between entering or not. This implies that in each
13location the local engineers￿remunerations absorb all expected pro￿ts from entry
in that location. Accordingly, the ex ante expected pro￿ts from entry in location
H (F) exactly match the ex post average pro￿ts of local producers e ￿
H (e ￿
F) times
the share of local entrants that decide to produce ￿H
D (￿F
D). The high-skill wage
in H (F) therefore equals wH = ￿H
De ￿
H=fE (wF = ￿F
De ￿
F=fE) both ex ante and
ex post, and both ex ante and ex post workers￿earnings on their lending are
driven to zero.
3.2 Consumption and production
Following Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), the characterization of the
equilibrium of the spatial economy proceeds in two steps. The ￿rst chacterizes
the indirect utility of engineers as a function of their spatial distribution ￿.
The second step endogenously determines the equilibrium spatial allocation of
engineers as the outcome of their utility maximizing decisions.
Di⁄erently from the isolated economy, in the spatial economy the number
of producers in and the number of sellers to each location may di⁄er from
one another. This is due to the presence of trade costs that allow only ￿rms
with low enough marginal costs to export. For parsimony, focus on location
H knowing that analogous expressions apply to location F. Let pH denote the
price threshold for positive demand in location H. Then (7) implies
pH =
￿￿ + ￿NHe pH
￿ + ￿NH (22)
where NH is the total number of ￿rms selling to location H, consisting of
domestic producers and foreign exporters, and e pH is the average price in location
H across domestic producers and foreign exporters.
Let pH
D(c) and qH
D(c) represent the domestic levels of the pro￿t maximizing
price and quantity sold by a ￿rm producing in location H with cost c. This ￿rm
may also decide to produce some output qH
X(c) to be exported at a delivered price
pH
X(c). The two local markets in H and F are assumed to be segmented, which
implies that ￿rms independently maximize the pro￿ts earned from domestic and
export sales. Then, by analogy with the closed economy, the pro￿t maximizing





































D = pH and cH
X = pF=￿ are the marginal cost cuto⁄s above which
producers located in H are unable to sell in their domestic and export markets
respectively. As trade barriers make it harder for exporters to break even relative
to domestic producers, entrants with marginal cost c between 0 and cH
X serve
both the domestic and export markets. Entrants with marginal cost c between
14cH
X and cH
D serve only the domestic market. Entrants with marginal cost c above
cH
D are not able to serve any market and exit. Prices and output levels (23) then



















for c 2 [0;cH
D=￿]
(24)
where the second expression exploits the fact that cH




D=￿. As in the isolated economy, the cuto⁄s measure the toughness
of competition and summarize all the e⁄ects of market conditions relevant for
￿rm performance in the corresponding locations.
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The corresponding indirect utilities evaluate to


























































for engineers. All these expressions clearly subsume the ones of the isolated
economy as a special case when trade vanishes (￿ ! 1).
Given that sH = ￿ and sF = 1 ￿ ￿, the foregoing expressions show that
indirect utilities (25) are determined by three endogenous variable: the two
cuto⁄s cH
D and cF
D, and the geographical distribution of engineers ￿. However,
cH
D and cF
D are themselves determined by ￿. To see this, consider two sets of
relations. First, given positive masses of entrants NH
E and NF























D=￿ as well as NH
E =
sHM=fE and NF











































For any given spatial allocation of engineers, equations (26) and (27) de￿ne a
system of four equations in four unknowns (cH
D, cF
D, NH, NF) that implicitly
determines them as functions of ￿ only. Just like in the isolated economy, unique-
ness of these mappings in granted by the opposite monotonicity properties of
the relations between the number of sellers and the marginal cost cuto⁄s embed-
ded in (26) and (27) respectively. The system is unfortunately not amenable to
analytical solutions. Exploiting uniqueness, it can nonetheless be solved numer-
ically, ￿nding the values of cH
D and cF
D that correspond to all possible values of
￿, thus allowing for a numerical characterization of engineers￿indirect utilities
(25) as functions of their spatial allocation ￿: V H
E (￿) and V F
E (￿).
3.3 Spatial equilibrium
The previous section has argued that two equilibrium marginal cost cuto⁄s cH
D
and cF
D are uniquely associated with any given distribution of engineers ￿. In
turn, these cuto⁄s determine the expected pro￿ts from entry and, therefore,
engineers￿incomes. They also determine their consumer surpluses and, thus,
their indirect utilities in the two locations. The next step is to determine the
equilibrium spatial allocation of engineers based on the fact that their location
choices must be utility maximizing.
Following the de￿nition in Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), the dis-
tribution ￿ 2 [0;1] is a spatial equilibrium if and only if no engineer can achieve
higher indirect utility by changing location. As V H
E and V F
E are both functions
of ￿, the indirect utility di⁄erential between locations H and F is also a function
of ￿:
￿V (￿) ￿ V H
E (￿) ￿ V F
E (￿)
A spatial equilibrium then arises at ￿ 2 (0;1) when
￿V (￿) = 0
16or at ￿ = 0 when ￿V (0) ￿ 0, or at ￿ = 1 when ￿V (1) ￿ 0.
In order to study the stability of a spatial equilibrium, assume that local
markets adjust instantaneously when some engineers move from one region to
the other. Assume also a myopic adjustment process such that the driving force
in the migration process is engineers￿current indirect utility di⁄erential:
:




￿V (￿) if 0 < ￿ < 1
minf0;￿V (￿)g if ￿ = 1
maxf0;￿V (￿)g if ￿ = 0
(28)
when t is time. Crucially, assume ￿nally that every period ￿rms have ￿rst to
bid for engineers and then to draw their unit worker requirements. This implies
that draws are not carried over from one period to the next. The reason for this
assumption is to focus on spatial selection while avoiding the di⁄erent issue of
spatial sorting.
Clearly, a spatial equilibrium implies
:
￿ = 0. If ￿V (￿) is positive, some en-
gineers will move from F to H; if it is negative, some will move in the opposite
direction. A spatial equilibrium is stable for (28) if, for any marginal deviation
from the equilibrium, the migration process brings the spatial allocation of engi-
neers back to the original one. Therefore, the agglomerated con￿guration (￿ = 0
or ￿ = 1) is always stable when it is an equilibrium while the dispersed con￿g-
uration (￿ 2 (0;1)) is stable if and only if the slope of ￿V (￿) is nonpositive in
a neighborhood of this point.
3.4 Core and periphery
The forces at work in the model are the ones highlighted by Ottaviano, Tabuchi
and Thisse (2002), here enriched by ￿rm selection ￿ la Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008). First, the immobility of workers is a dispersion force as long as there
is trade between the two locations. The agglomeration force ￿nds its origin in
a demand e⁄ect generated by the preference for variety. If a larger number of
￿rms are located, say, in location H, there are two e⁄ects at work. First, less
varieties are imported. Second, the average price of all varieties sold in H is
lower due not only to lower markups but also to lower marginal costs thanks
to selection. Both e⁄ects, in turn, induce some consumers to migrate toward
region H. The resulting increase in the number of consumers creates a larger
local demand for the di⁄erentiated good, which locally raises expected pro￿ts
(hence, engineers￿wages) promoting more entry and this maps into a larger
number of local producers. Di⁄erently from Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse
(2002), the increase in the number of producers is less than proportionate to
the increase in the number of entrants and this is due to tougher selection in
the expanding market.
The hallmark of Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) and similar models
in the ￿ new economic geography￿tradition is the fact that trade barriers reg-
ulate the balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces: starting with
high enough trade barriers, trade liberalization breeds agglomeration (see, e.g.,
17Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert-Nicoud, 2003). Figure 1 shows
that this is true also in the present model. As in Ottaviano, Tabuchi and
Thisse (2002), with high trade barriers the dispersed allocation (￿ = 1=2) is the
only spatial equilibrium. As trade barriers fall (smaller ￿), this allocation be-
comes unstable and agglomeration in either location emerges as the only spatial
equilibrium. However, di⁄erently from Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002)
the emergence of the agglomerated equilibrium is not chatastrophic driving the
economy from dispersion (￿ = 1=2) straigth to full agglomeration (￿ = 0 or
￿ = 1). As trade barriers gradually fall, at some point the dispersed allocation
loses stability to two stable equilibria with partial agglomeration (0 < ￿ < 1=2
or 1=2 < ￿ < 1) evenly spaced around it. These are initially in a neighbor-
hood of the dispersed allocation. Then, as trade barriers keep on falling, they
gradually move away from dispersion until the economy hits full agglomeration.
Hence, thanks to selection among heterogeneous ￿rms, the model is able
to generate the realistic feature of partial agglomeration as a stable equilib-
rium outcome provided that trade barriers are neither too high nor too low.
In this equilibrium, the larger location exhibits more entrants, more sellers and
thus more product variety, lower average cost, lower average price, lower aver-
age markup. As all these features imply higher consumer surplus, indi⁄erence
￿V (￿) = 0 is sustained by lower expected pro￿ts (smaller w) due to a lower
success rate of entry (smaller ￿D) that more than o⁄set any higher average pro￿t
from successful entry (larger e ￿).
Note that introducing urban costs as in Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse
(2002) would generate redispersion as trade barriers get very low. In the partial
agglomeration equilibrium, it would also lead not only to higher average pro￿ts
but also to higher expected pro￿ts in the larger location in order to compensate
for its higher urban costs.
3.5 Agglomeration, dispersion and heterogeneity
What is the impact of heterogeneity on core-periphery patterns? The analysis
of the isolated economy has shown that more cost-increasing richness (larger
cM) weakens the impact of larger market size on selection. The opposite holds
for more cost-decreasing evenness (smaller k). Therefore, heterogeneity must
a⁄ect the balance between dispersion and agglomeration forces in the spatial
economy, and the e⁄ect of heterogeneity must be di⁄erent depending on whether
it increases or decreases the chances of high unit worker requirement draws.
Figure 2 shows the e⁄ects of more cost-increasing richness (larger cM) on the
patterns depicted in Figure 1. High, mid and low heterogeneity corresponds to
large, intermediate and small cM respectively. In this case more heterogeneity
shifts the balance in favor of agglomeration forces. This happens because selec-
tion in the larger location gets weaker as worse unit worker requirement draws
become possible.
Figures 3 and 4 show the e⁄ects of more cost-decreasing evenness (smaller
k). High, mid and low heterogeneity corresponds to small, intermediate and
large k respectively. When the initial distribution of unit worker requirement
18draws is already rather even (Figure 3), additional evenness shifts the balance
in favor of agglomeration forces. Vice versa, when the initial distribution of unit
worker requirement draws is rather uneven (Figure 4), additional evenness shifts
the balance in favor of dispersion forces. The reason for this is that, when initial
evenness is low (large k), more evenness (smaller k) has a weak positive e⁄ect
on the average pro￿t di⁄erential (e ￿
H vs. e ￿
F) and a strong negative e⁄ect on
the success rate di⁄erential (￿H
D vs. ￿F
D), thus fostering dispersion. Vice versa,
when the initial evenness is already high, more evenness has a strong positive
e⁄ect on the average pro￿t di⁄erential and a weak negative e⁄ect on the success
rate di⁄erential, thus fostering agglomeration. This does not happen in the case
of more richness as larger cM does not a⁄ect the elasticity of the success rate









This paper has investigated how ￿rm heterogeneity a⁄ects the balance between
agglomeration and dispersion forces in the presence of pecuniary externalities
in a model of monopolistic competition with variable mark-ups. In so doing, it
has proposed a model that exhibits all the key features the model of Ottaviano,
Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) and similar models in the ￿ new economic geography￿
tradition. In particular, trade barriers regulate the balance between agglomer-
ation forces (market-size and cost-of-living e⁄ects) and dispersion forces (com-
petition e⁄ect): starting with high enough trade barriers, trade liberalization
shifts the spatial equilibrium from dispersion to agglomeration.
In the proposed model, however, ￿rm selection acts as an additional disper-
sion force. A ￿rst implication of this additional force is that, di⁄erently from
Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002), the emergence of agglomeration is not
chatastrophic, which is more realistic. A second implication is that ￿rm hetero-
geneity matters for the balance between agglomeration and dispersion forces.
However, whether it shifts the balance from agglomeration to dispersion forces
or the other way round depends on its speci￿c features along the two de￿niting
dimensions of richness and evenness. This result shows that the role of ￿rm
heterogeneity in spatial models with selection can not be fully understood with-
out paying due attention to various moments of the undelying ￿rm productivity
distributions. A similar conclusion is reached by Okubo and Picard (2011) for
a sorting model with taste heterogeneity.
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Parameters: α=10; γ=2; fE=2; k=1; η=10; L=50; M=20; cM=15; τ=2.5, 2.9, 3.1. 
 





Parameters: α=10; γ=2; fE=2; k=1; η=10; L=50; M=20; cM=5, 15, 30; τ=2.9. 
 
Figure 2 – More cost-increasing richness fosters agglomeration   22
 
Parameters: α=10; γ=2; fE=2; k=1, 1.1, 1.3; η=10; L=50; M=20; cM=25; τ=2.9. 
 
Figure 3 – More cost-decreasing evenness fosters agglomeration if initial 





Parameters: α=10; γ=2; fE=2; k=1.3, 2.6, 4; η=10; L=50; M=20; cM=25; τ=2.9. 
 
Figure 4 – More cost-decreasing evenness fosters dispersion if initial 
evenness is small enough 
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